# Tweaking Fernet **URL:** \ **Category:** Aztec\ **Tags:** sequencers\ **Created:** [November 22, 2023, 7:44pm UTC](https://forum.aztec.network/t/tweaking-fernet/2567 "2023-11-22T19:44:39Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 4
**Author:** ![Anon](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/47e85d/32.png) [@Anon](https://forum.aztec.network/u/Anon)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2023, 7:37am UTC](https://forum.aztec.network/t/tweaking-fernet/2567/4 "2023-11-23T07:37:11Z")
These tweaks exacerbate the sequencer decentralization deficiencies of Fernet. Namely, the hardware and MEV-sophistication requirements favor centralized sequencers. > Hardware requirements for sequencers must be similar to those of Ethereum validators Out-of-protocol proving is insufficient [[1]](https://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-pbs-proposer-builder-separation/2283/3). Either an (optional) [in-protocol auction](https://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-provers-bonded-prover-auction/2401) or [PBS](https://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-pbs-proposer-builder-separation/2283/2) would be minimally sufficient. Sequencer bidding creates centralization: “Sophisticated sequencers” (e.g. higher MEV, cheaper provers) will be able outbid “naive sequencers”, using a lower VRF. This will cause naive sequencers to exit, or sophisticate (e.g. blindly auction off their VRF in a secondary market). PBS addresses this issue by enshrining the auction. Separately, to avoid the burn, sequencers will collude to keep bids low (e.g. split an out-of-protocol MEV auction with the top VRF holders). This further centralizes stake. I suggest skipping 1 L1 block (“halting period”) before the “backup phase” begins, to combat [Profitable Censorship MEV](https://youtu.be/zEnySS0kh1s?si=DbIM1-jyNEFSl64G) [[2]](https://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-pbs-proposer-builder-separation/2283/7). --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.aztec.network/t/tweaking-fernet/2567)._