# Request for Comments: Aztec Governance **URL:** \ **Category:** Aztec\ **Tags:** rfc\ **Created:** [January 17, 2025, 8:17am UTC](https://forum.aztec.network/t/request-for-comments-aztec-governance/7413 "2025-01-17T08:17:56Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 10
**Author:** ![Anon](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/47e85d/32.png) [@Anon](https://forum.aztec.network/u/Anon)\ **Post date:** [January 22, 2025, 7:35am UTC](https://forum.aztec.network/t/request-for-comments-aztec-governance/7413/10 "2025-01-22T07:35:55Z")
> [@amin](#): > > there’s no way to prevent governance from changing RATE Make Hypothetical Asset an OssifyingRateERC20 that restricts mint(). Really, RATE should be fixed from day 1 (or only decrease). Has there been consideration to issuing on a curve based on percentage of staked tokens? > [@amin](#): > > are you aware of a time where this happened in live decentralized governance setting? No. > [@amin](#): > > It should not be cheap to just buy a lot of Assets, vote maliciously and then exit immediately Asset holders may sell just their voting rights. A delay does seem like it would raise the price of votes though. [Votes as buy orders](https://ethresear.ch/t/votes-as-buy-orders-a-new-type-of-hybrid-coin-voting-futarchy/10305) attempts to solve this problem. > [@amin](#): > > who should receive this and under what conditions? The proposer (burner) receives the reward if the vote passes. The burn itself is payment by the proposer for failure (to all holders). Voters are incentivized because the proposal adds value to the network. (I expect most votes to come from stakers where the cost to vote is low/0). > [@amin](#): > > What could be done to at-least decrease odds of successful collusion? Decrease the value of collusion, by limiting the power of governance (e.g. fixing RATE). If slashing costs anything then the cost to bribe not-to-slash approaches 0. However, vote-to-slash is not necessary: > [@Request For Comments: Aztec's Block Production System](https://forum.aztec.network/t/request-for-comments-aztecs-block-production-system/6155/6): > > In practice, provers will run a full node to make sure they have all the data they need before making a bid. > … > Depending on the final slashing design, the sequencer and/or entire committee could be slashed which sets a minimum cost for such an attack. The real problem is stalling attacks are too cheap: > [@Request For Comments: Aztec's Block Production System](https://forum.aztec.network/t/request-for-comments-aztecs-block-production-system/6155/8): > > So stalling costs `min(TOTAL_COMMITEE_REWARD * 1/3, SEQUENCER_BLOCK_REWARDS * 13)` per epoch. [Re-Based](https://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-re-based/3210) can be adapted to use Hypothetical Asset by enshrining an AMM, where `block-fee` is used to buy and distribute the asset to the ILC. Based-rollups pair well with Unified Addresses, no need for token-voting governance. > [@amin](#): > > Can you elaborate how SECURITY\_AUDIT\_REWARD would work? Extend propose to `propose(upgrade_addr, [auditor_addr])`. Once tabled, a majority of auditor\_addrs must endorse the upgrade. If the vote succeeds, SECURITY\_AUDIT\_REWARD is split amongst auditor\_addrs. Most of the value relies on the social layer endorsing a set of trustworthy auditors. --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.aztec.network/t/request-for-comments-aztec-governance/7413)._