Make Hypothetical Asset an OssifyingRateERC20 that restricts mint(). Really, RATE should be fixed from day 1 (or only decrease).
Has there been consideration to issuing on a curve based on percentage of staked tokens?
No.
Asset holders may sell just their voting rights. A delay does seem like it would raise the price of votes though. Votes as buy orders attempts to solve this problem.
The proposer (burner) receives the reward if the vote passes. The burn itself is payment by the proposer for failure (to all holders). Voters are incentivized because the proposal adds value to the network. (I expect most votes to come from stakers where the cost to vote is low/0).
Decrease the value of collusion, by limiting the power of governance (e.g. fixing RATE). If slashing costs anything then the cost to bribe not-to-slash approaches 0.
However, vote-to-slash is not necessary:
The real problem is stalling attacks are too cheap:
Re-Based can be adapted to use Hypothetical Asset by enshrining an AMM, where block-fee is used to buy and distribute the asset to the ILC. Based-rollups pair well with Unified Addresses, no need for token-voting governance.
Extend propose to propose(upgrade_addr, [auditor_addr]). Once tabled, a majority of auditor_addrs must endorse the upgrade. If the vote succeeds, SECURITY_AUDIT_REWARD is split amongst auditor_addrs. Most of the value relies on the social layer endorsing a set of trustworthy auditors.