# \[Proposal\] - When the levee breaks

**URL:** <https://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-when-the-levee-breaks/2457>\
**Category:** Aztec\
**Tags:** rfp, provers\
**Created:** [October 25, 2023, 12:09pm UTC](https://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-when-the-levee-breaks/2457 "2023-10-25T12:09:26Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 2

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**Author:** ![Anon](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/47e85d/32.png) [@Anon](https://forum.aztec.network/u/Anon)\
**Post date:** [October 25, 2023, 7:20pm UTC](https://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-when-the-levee-breaks/2457/2 "2023-10-25T19:20:34Z")

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What stops a sequencer from accepting multiple proving requests?

- If you slash sequencers for duplicate signatures, what stops malicious/bribed provers from bidding and then refusing to prove?
  - If you slash provers for refusing, then sequencers can greif anyone who bids.
    - [BPA](http://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-provers-bonded-prover-auction/2401) solves this by having `proposers` attest to the auction results

Prover groups must hold enough addresses for a ~0% levy, otherwise third parties will substitute (creating pressure on sequencers). This makes the proposal almost equivalent to [BPA](http://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-provers-bonded-prover-auction/2401) (prover-addresses \* prover-stake == prover-bond), except stake is less efficient (as consecutive prover proofs are discouraged).

> [@PhilWindle](#):
>
> that would make it economically unattractive to accumulate staking addresses

If you charge addresses a negative interest rate, it becomes unattractive to accumulate them. The problem is meaningful overhead will move the auction out-of-protocol.

I suggest a gas rebate for proof submission, to improve the efficiency of the auction [[1]](http://forum.aztec.network/t/proposal-provers-bonded-prover-auction/2401/6).

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