What stops a sequencer from accepting multiple proving requests?
- If you slash sequencers for duplicate signatures, what stops malicious/bribed provers from bidding and then refusing to prove?
- If you slash provers for refusing, then sequencers can greif anyone who bids.
- BPA solves this by having
proposers
attest to the auction results
- BPA solves this by having
- If you slash provers for refusing, then sequencers can greif anyone who bids.
Prover groups must hold enough addresses for a ~0% levy, otherwise third parties will substitute (creating pressure on sequencers). This makes the proposal almost equivalent to BPA (prover-addresses * prover-stake == prover-bond), except stake is less efficient (as consecutive prover proofs are discouraged).
If you charge addresses a negative interest rate, it becomes unattractive to accumulate them. The problem is meaningful overhead will move the auction out-of-protocol.
I suggest a gas rebate for proof submission, to improve the efficiency of the auction [1].