# Aztec's New Slashing Design

**URL:** <https://forum.aztec.network/t/aztecs-new-slashing-design/8143>\
**Category:** Aztec\
**Created:** [October 10, 2025, 4:22pm UTC](https://forum.aztec.network/t/aztecs-new-slashing-design/8143 "2025-10-10T16:22:52Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 4

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**Author:** ![Anon](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/47e85d/32.png) [@Anon](https://forum.aztec.network/u/Anon)\
**Post date:** [October 20, 2025, 3:52am UTC](https://forum.aztec.network/t/aztecs-new-slashing-design/8143/4 "2025-10-20T03:52:54Z")

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Vote-to-slash is fundamentally broken and should be removed entirely.

> [@Request for Comments: Aztec Governance](https://forum.aztec.network/t/request-for-comments-aztec-governance/7413/7):
>
> All vote-to-slash mechanisms are vulnerable to collusion. e.g. an L1 contract which pays out if targeted validators are slashed or if a prover is not slashed.

> [@amin](#):
>
> 1. Inactivity Offence

This is provable, therefore no vote is necessary (like Ethereum, leak the balance and remove via proof when insufficient).

> [@amin](#):
>
> 1. Epoch Prune Offence  
> …
> 2. Data Withholding

Because blocks are attested as being available and provable by the committee when posted, these slashings should be automatic.

> [@amin](#):
>
> 1. Invalid Signatures  
> …
> 2. Attesting on Invalid Blocks

Provable.

> [@amin](#):
>
> The Slashing Vetoer

Instead, have slashed funds locked up temporarily such that the committee can undo it.

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